In the game of poker, opens and raises are considered aggressive plays, while calls and checks are considered passive (though a check-raise would be considered a very aggressive play). It is said that “aggression has its own value”, meaning that often aggressive plays can make money with weak hands because of bluff value. In general, opponents must respond to aggressive play by playing more loosely, which offers more opportunities to make mistakes.
While it is true that aggressive play is generally superior to passive play, using any play exclusively can lead to predictability, and being too predictable is far worse than being too passive. A player who is constantly aggressive and plays many inferior hands is called a “maniac”, and skilled players will take advantage of him by calling him more often, using isolation plays, and by other means.
If a player is not aggressive with his weaker hands, the opponents can safely fold whenever the player does bet or raise. The appropriate amount of aggression can be computed using game theory, and depends on the game being played and the tendencies of the opponents.
In the card game of new usa online casinos 2022 real money , to bluff is to bet or raise with an inferior hand. This is useful because it can cause other players to believe the bluffing player has a dominant hand, so that they all fold; the bluffing player then wins the pot. By extension, the terms are often used outside the context of poker to describe the acts of pretending knowledge one does not have, or making threats one cannot execute.
A pure bluff, or stone-cold bluff, is a bet or raise with an inferior hand that has little or no chance of improving. A player making a pure bluff believes he can only win the pot if all opponents fold. The pot odds for a bluff are the ratio of the size of the bluff to the pot. A pure bluff has a positive expectation (will be profitable in the long run) when the probability of being called by an opponent is lower than the pot odds for the bluff.
For example, suppose that after all the cards are out, a player holding a busted drawing hand decides that the only way to win the pot is to make a pure bluff. If the player bets the size of the pot on a pure bluff, the bluff will have a positive expectation if the probability of being called is less than 50%. Note, however, that the opponent may also consider the pot odds when deciding whether to call. In this example, the opponent will be facing 2-to-1 pot odds for the call. The opponent will have a positive expectation for calling the bluff if the opponent believes the probability the player is bluffing is at least 33%.
In games with multiple betting rounds, to bluff on one round with an inferior or drawing hand that might improve in a later round is called a semi-bluff. A player making a semi-bluff can win the pot two different ways: by all opponents folding immediately or by catching a card to improve the player’s hand. In some cases a player may be on a draw but with odds strong enough that he is favored to win the hand. In this case his bet is not classified as a semi-bluff even though his bet may force opponents to fold hands with better current strength.
For example, a player in a stud poker game with four spade-suited cards showing (but none among their downcards) on the penultimate round might raise, hoping that his opponents believe he already has a flush. If his bluff fails and he is called, he still might be dealt a spade on the final card and win the showdown (or he might be dealt another non-spade and try his bluff again, in which case it is a pure bluff on the final round rather than a semi-bluff).
Bluffing may be more effective in some circumstances than others. Bluffs have a higher expectation when the probability of being called decreases. Several game circumstances may decrease the probability of being called (and increase the profitability of the bluff):
Fewer opponents who must fold to the bluff.
The bluff provides less favorable pot odds to opponents for a call.
A scare card comes that increases the number of superior hands that the player may be perceived to have.
The player’s betting pattern in the hand has been consistent with the superior hand they are representing with the bluff.
The opponent’s betting pattern suggests the opponent may have a marginal hand that is vulnerable to a greater number of potential superior hands.
The opponent’s betting pattern suggests the opponent may have a drawing hand and the bluff provides unfavorable pot odds to the opponent for chasing the draw.
Opponents are not irrationally committed to the pot (see sunk cost fallacy).
Opponents are sufficiently skilled and paying sufficient attention.
Optimal Bluffing Frequency:
If a player bluffs too infrequently, observant opponents will recognize that the player is betting for value and will only call with very strong hands or with drawing hands when they are receiving favorable pot odds. If a player bluffs too frequently, observant opponents snap-off his bluffs by calling or reraising. Occasional bluffing disguises not just the hands a player is bluffing with, but also his legitimate hands that opponents may think he may be bluffing with. David Sklansky, in his book The Theory of Poker, states “Mathematically, the optimal bluffing strategy is to bluff in such a way that the chances against your bluffing are identical to the pot odds your opponent is getting.”
Optimal bluffing also requires that the bluffs must be performed in such a manner that opponents cannot tell when a player is bluffing or not. To prevent bluffs from occurring in a predictable pattern, game theory suggests the use of a randomizing agent to determine whether to bluff. For example, a player might use the colors of his hidden cards, the second hand on his watch, or some other unpredictable mechanism to determine whether to bluff.